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Abstract. Linear closed-loop no-memory strategies for the LQ Nash 
game are considered. We exhibit a class of such problems with the 
property that the solution exists for any finite time interval; for the 
infinite time case, there exist none or a unique or many solutions, 
depending on the choice of the parameters. In addition, the limit of the 
finite time solution as the time interval increases does not have to yield 
the infinite time case solution. A geometric formulation of the coupled 
algebraic Riccati equation is given, This formulation seems to be an 
interesting starting point for a thorough study of these equations. 
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1. Introduction 
The linear-quadratic Nash game has received a lot of attention, but it 
has not yet reached the degree of maturity of the linear-quadratic control 
problem. A central issue is the investigation of the linear, closed-loop 
no-memory strategies. There are several partial results in this direction, 
but a relatively complete study is not available. See Ref. 1 for a quite recent 
exposition on this topic and related references. 
In this paper, we consider two issues related to this problem. In the 
first, we consider a class of problems which have the following properties. 
The finite time version admits a unique solution for any arbitrary but finite 
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time interval, whereas the infinite time version might have many, one, or 
no solution. Moreover, even if the infinite time version has a solution, it 
does not have to be the limit of the finite time solution. A similar observation 
was demonstrated in Ref. 2 for a zero-sum, linear-quadratic game. In the 
second, we provide a geometric formulation of the two algebraic Riccati 
equations, whose study is a central issue in solving linear-quadratic Nash 
games. This formulation isof interest and, in our opinion, it deserves further 
attention. 
2. Linear-Quadratic, Closed-Loop, No-Memory Nash Game 
Consider a dynamic system whose state x evolves according to 
Jc=Ax+Bul+Bu2, x(0) = Xo, t~[0, T], (1) 
and two cost functions, 
fo J~(u~, u2)=x'(r)O~Tx(r)+ (x'O~x+ulu~-u}uj) dr, 
i~] , i , ]= l ,2 ,  (2) 
x(t) ~ R", u~(t) ~ R".  The matrices A, B, Q~T, O~ are real, constant, with 
appropriate dimensions, 
Oi = Q~ >- O, QiT = O~7" >- O, 
and (A, B) is assumed to be a controllable pair. Given two strategy spaces 
UI, U2 from which ut, u2 are chosen respectively, we call a pair (ul, u2) 
U1 x Uz a Nash equilibrium if
J l(Ul ~, u~2)NJl(Ul, u~2), VUlC U1, (3) 
J2(u*, u*)-< I2(u*, u2), Vu2e U~. 
We restrict Us, U2 to be of the following type: 
(i) If T < + ce, U~ consists of all u~ = L~x, where L~ is any rn x n real 
matrix, which is a continuous function of t. 
(ii) If T= +~,inwhichcaseweset Qir=O, Uiconsistsofall ui=L~x, 
where L~ is any m x n real constant matrix. 
Our aim is to study the Nash equilibria for cases (i) and (ii) and their 
interplay. 
Case (i): T<+oo.  It is known that a pair (u*, u*) is a Nash equili- 
brium if and only if 
u* = -B'K~x, i-- 1, 2, (4) 
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where 
- I (1 = ( A - BB'  K2)' K~ + K I ( A - BB '  K2) + Q1 -- KzBB'  K2 
- KIBB'K1,  (5) 
-1~2 = ( A -  BB '  K1)' K2 + K2( A - BB'K1) + O2-  K1BB'  K1 
-KzBB 'Kz ,  (6) 
KI(T) = Q~r, K2(T) = O2r, t~ [0, T]. (7) 
Adding and subtracting (5) and (6) gives the following equivalent system: 
-(d/dr) (K 1 + g2) = A' (K 1 + g2) + (KI + K2)A + 0131- 02 
- (K1 +K2)2BB'(K1 + K2), (8) 
KI(T)+K2(T)=QxT+Q2T, t~[0, T], (9) 
-(d/dt)(K1-K2)=A'(K1-Ki)+(K1-K2)A+01-O:, (10) 
KI(T)-K2(T)=Q~T-Q2r, t~[0, T]. (11) 
It is obvious now that g I +K2 does not blow up in any finite time; and, as 
T + + m, KI(0) + K2(0) goes to a stabilizing, positive-semidefinite solution 
of the corresponding algebraic Riccati equation. Since (A, B) is assumed 
controllable, if (A, (Q1 + Q2) 1/2) is an observable pair this solution of the 
algebraic Riccati equation is unique. K1-K2 obeys the linear differential 
equation (10), and thus does not blow up in any finite time. As T~ 
+m, KI(0)-K2(0) might become unbounded, or oscillate, or converge to 
some limit; what will happen depends obviously on A, Q I -  Q2 and Qlr -  
Q2r. Our conclusion is the following: The finite time Nash game (1)-(3) 
admits a unique linear solution for any arbitrarily large, but finite, time 
interval [0, T]. We can choose A, Qi, Qir so as to have that K1,/(2 converge, 
or become unbounded, or oscillate. 
Case (ii)" T = +co. If a Nash equilibrium exists, it will be of the form 
u* = -B 'K ix ,  i = 1, 2, (12) 
where 
0 = (A - BB'K2)'K1 + K1 (A -  BB'K2) + Q1 - KzBB 'K2-  K IBB 'K I ,  
(13) 
0 = (A  - BB'K~)'K2 + K2(A - BB'K~) + O2-  K IBB'K~ - K2BB'K2. 
(14) 
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Adding and subtracting (13) and (14) yields the following equivalent system: 
0 = A'(K~ + K2) + (K1 + K2)A + Q~ + 02 -- (K1 + K2)2BB'(K~ + K2), 
(15) 
0 = A'(K1 - K2) + (K~ - / (2 )A  + Q1 - Q2. (16) 
Since 
J* +J*  = x ' (O l+O2)x=x 'o (K l+Ka)xo ,  01+02>-0,  
K~ + K2 has to be positive semidefinite. Thus, assuming (A, B) controllable, 
and (A, (On+ 02) 1/2) observable, we conclude that K~+K2 will be the 
unique positive-definite stabilizing solution of (15). For K1-K2  to exist, 
we have to assume that there exists a Y = Y' satisfying 
0 = A'  Y + YA  + 01 - Q2, (17) 
in which case 
Y=K1-K2 .  
It is obvious that (17) might have many, one, or no solutions. Even if (17) 
has a unique solution, this solution does not have to be the limit of the 
solution of the differential equation (10)-(11), since the solution of (10)- 
(11) might not have a limit as T ~ + oo. Of course, if the solution of (10)-(11) 
has a limit as T~+~,  then this limit is a solution of (17). The basic 
conclusion isthe following. The system (13)-(14) might have one, or many, 
or no solutions. Even if it has a solution, this solution does not need to be 
the limit of the solutions of (5)-(7). 
That the limit of the finite time solution, as T ~ + o0, does not have to 
be the infinite-time solution has also been observed in Ref. 2 for the case 
of zero-sum games. 
Although the above-stated conclusion refers to the Riccati equations, 
which provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium 
pair, we can use that to create Nash games where the finite-time solution 
does not converge as T ~ + co to the infinite-time solution. 
3. Geometric Formulation ot the Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations 
It is known that the problem of finding all the symmetric solutions of 
the algebraic Riccati equation 
0 = A 'K  + KA + Q -KBB 'K  (18) 
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can be reformulated equivalently as follows (see Refs. 3 and 4): (18) can 
be written as 
or  
. [. A (19) 
[K : - I ]  --Q I -A ' - I LK - I  
[/3 [13 As = g X, (20) 
where X is some n x n matrix and As is the system matrix 
-A '  3" (21) 
Thus, if one is able to find the n-dimensional subspaces ~ in R 2" for which 
t 
it holds that 
As~C_ ~ (22) 
or the 2n x n matrices 
v = ~ }n (23) 
}n' 
whose columns constitute a basis for ~ and V~ -1, exist and V2V71 is 
symmetric, one has a solution 
K = V2 V-[ 1 
of (18). A simple-minded way of doing that is briefly the following: If 
A V = VY, (24) 
for some n x n matrix Y, let T -~ YT  be the Jordan form of Y, and thus 
A, VT = VT~ -1  YT. (25) 
Let 
VT=gr=[v l  Va "'" v,], (26) 
I 1 T -1YT= A 1 . (27) 0 
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Then, 
Asvl = hOl, 
Asvz = Xv2 + vl, (28) 
. . , ,  
, . . ,  
Thus, we can find the eigenvectors and generalized eigenvectors of As, and 
group them appropriately so as to create 
Since 
V, = I?IT -1, V2 = I?2T-', 
we need 17"1 to be invertible and 
v~ V~ -1 = 92 9~ 1 
to be symmetric. Thus, the whole issue is the appropriate choice of n 
eigenvectors and generalized igenvectors of As. Needless to say that we 
are usually interested only in some of the solutions of (18), so that the 
closed-loop matrix A-  BB 'K  is stable. The point to be made here is that 
the generic problem that underlies this method of solving (18) is the problem 
of finding the n-dimensional subspaces ~F in R 2" which are As invariant, i.e., 
As°F C ~. 
Let us now generalize the previous formulation to the linear-quadratic, 
closed-loop, no-memory Nash game. Let the system equation and the two 
costs be given by 
fc = Ax  + Blul  + Bzu2, 
io o Ji = (x'O~x+u~ui+u~Rouj) dt, i~] , i , ]= l ,2 ,  
where Oi, Ro are symmetric. If a pair (Ul, u2) is a Nash equilibrium where 
each u~ at time t is a linear function of x(t), it has to be given by 
u~ = - B~K~, i = 1, 2, (29) 
where the matrices Kt,/(2 are symmetric and satisfy the system 
0 = K I (A -  B2B~Ke) + (A -  B2B~K2)'K1 + Q1 +K2BERlaB~K2 
- KaB1B'IK1, (30) 
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0 = K2(A- B1B~K1) + (A -  B1B~K~)'K2 + Q2 + K1B1R21B'lK1 
-K2B2B~K2. (31) 
Conditions (30) and (31) are only necessary for the pair (29) to be a Nash 
equilibrium. 
This system can be written as 
[°A A 0 ][I] 
[I, gl, Ks] -B1B~ -B2B~ K1 = 0, (32) 
-B2B'2 B2R12B'2 K2 
[°o o 
[I, K1, Kz] B1R21B~ 
-BIB~ 
a I' ] -B1B'I K1 = O, 
-BeB~..] K: 
(33) 
or equivalently, 
I[ ] -?Ill 01 A' 0 I -K1 X , -BIB~ -B2B~ K1 = Z -B2B~ B2RIzB'~._! K: 
[QA0~ 0 A' ] [  I ]  [ - i l - / (2~ ] [y ]  B1R21B'~ -BIB'1 K1 = W ' 
-B1B~ -BzB'2 K2 
where X, Y, Z, W are some n x n matrices. It is easy to see that 
X=W. 
(34) 
(35) 
We can put these two conditions together to obtain 
x 
A~ K1 = 0 0 , (36) 
2 K1 0 
2 K1 
where 
0 B1R21B~ -B1B~ I
A~ = 0 -B2B~ B2 2B . (37) 
-01 -A '  
-02 0 -A '  [ 
558 JOTA: VOL. 42, NO. 4, APRIL 1984 
Let 
[i00] [i01 I01 0 0 L1 = 0 0 0 ,  L2 = 0 0 ,  L3-- 0 . (38) 
I 0 0 
0 I 0 
Solving (36) is easily seen to be equivalent to the following problem: Find 
the n-dimensional subspaces A/of  R 3~ for which it holds that 
Af  ~ C_ La~ + Lz~ + L3J/(. (39) 
If the 3n x n matrix 
[ il '° tn 
is a basis for ~ ,  where Mo 1 exists and M1Mo 1, M2Mo 1 are symmetric, then 
K1 = MoMo', K2 = M2Mo 1 
solve (30), (31). Solving (39) for ~t is equivalent to finding the matrices 
M for which it holds that 
ANs M = L1MX1 + L2MY1 + L3MZ1, (40) 
for some n x n matrices X,,  Y~, Z1. If we were to imitate (24)-(28), we 
should proceed as follows. Let T be an n x n invertible matrix. Then, (40) 
can be written as 
A~JQI = Llh4T-1X1T + L2h'IT -1 Y1T + L3J~T-IZ1 T, 
where 
Mo 
LM2TJ  
We can assume that T- IX,  T is in Jordan form as we did for T - 'YT  in 
(27), but the form of T-1YIT, T-1ZIT is not necessarily Jordan. Thus, a 
difficulty of imitating (24)-(28) lies in not being able, with a single matrix 
T, to have Jordan forms T-1X, T, T -1 Y, T, T-1Z1T simultaneously for the 
three matrices X1, Y1, ZI. 
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A different geometric formulation of (30)-(31) is the following: Let 
A - B1B'IK1 - B2B'2K2 = X, 
? ! 
B2B2K1 - B2R12B2K2 = - Z, 
BIB~K2-BaR21BrlK1 =-  y. 
We can rewrite (30)-(31) as 
K1X =- (A ' /2 )K~-  Q~/2 + WI, 
KEX = - (A ' /2 )K2-  Q2/2+ WE, 
(A ' /2 )K I+ Q1/2+ Wt = -K2Z,  
(A ' /2)K2 + Q2/2+ W2 = - KI Y, 
for some W1, W2. Thus, we can write the following system which is 
equivalent to (30)-(31): 
K~ + W~ = K~ X, 
L-Q2/2 0 -A ' /2  J K2 W 2 K2 
(41) 
[0] 
+ W3 = K 1 Z, (42) 
-w~ LK~J [0 
-o;,2 0 %,2 ~, 
0 K2 
[0] [,] 
+ -W2 = K1 Y, (43) 
W4 K2 
for some X, Y, Z, WI, Wz, W3, W4. 
If we denote by oA c the space in R 7n spanned by the columns of the matrix 
I 
Kt 
K2 
W1 , 
W~ 
W~ 
_w4 
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we can rewrite (41)-(43) as 
A1,/f C_LN, A2JC'C_LY, A3NC_LN, (44) 
where A1, A2, A3 are known 3n x 7n matrices and   ooooo ] 
L= I 0 0 0 0 . 
0 I 0 0 0 
Thus, we tlave imbedded the problem (30)-(31) into (44), i.e., into finding 
the n-dimensional spaces N in R 7n which satisfy simultaneously the three 
invariance properties 
A~C(C_LN, i = 1, 2, 3. 
In concluding this section, we should point out two things. The first 
one is that we need to solve (39) or (44) which are generalizations of (22). 
Although we do not know at present how to achieve that, it seems to us 
that these formulations of the problem of solving (30)-(31) are quite 
appealing and deserve further attention. The s cond is that the role of the 
system matrix As [see (21)] of the control problem is assumed in the game 
case by A~ [see (37)] in conjunction with L1, L2, La [see (38)]. 
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